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G.: Interpretation of Intentional Injury Clauses in Insurance Policie
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
that would place the court in the inconsistent position of refusing
to apply on the one hand, a principle which it freely applies on the
other. Nor does it seem particularly strained to say, when the
plaintiff is denied relief because of his laches, ° because he refuses
to do equity,"' or because of unconscionable conduct,3 2 that the court
is but weighing the equities between the parties, and that these too
are but applications of the general doctrine. However this may
be, it is apparent that practical experience has demonstrated to our
court the advisability of frankly recognizing the doctrine in order
to prevent undue hardship to the defendant or the public, and to
encourage our economic and industrial progress."
C. E. G.
INTERPRETATION OF INTENTIONAL INJURY
CLAUSES IN INSURANCE POLICIES
The West Virginia cases of Harper v. Jefferson Standard Life
Insurance Company' and Adkins v. Provident Life and Accident
Insurance Company2 decided this year, raise the interesting question of the interpretation to be given clauses in insurance policies
limiting the liability of the insurer where the injuries were inflicted
on the insured intentionally by a third party. As respects wording, such clauses fall substantially into four classes, the limitation
being imposed where the injury was (1) intentionally inflicted by
a third party,3 (2) the result of design on the part of any third
party,4 (3) an intentional injury inflicted by a third party,' and
(4) inflicted by the intentional act of a third party. Courts seem
to be unanimous in treating the first three clauses as identical, but

go

Smith v. Casto, 107 W. Va. 1, 148 S. E. 566 (1929); Carter v. Price, 85
W. Va. 744, 102 S. E. 685 (1920) ; Drahe v. O'Brien, 99 W. Va. 582, 130 S. E.

276 (1925).

31 Ice v. Barlow, 85 W. Va. 490, 102 S. E. 127 (1920) ; Watzman v. Unatin,
101 W. Va. 41, 53, 131 S. E. 874 (1926).
32 Wood v. Snodgrass, 116 W. Va. 538, 182 S. E. 286 (1935) ; Thompson v.
Hall, 104 W. Va. 76, 138 S. E. 579 (1927) ; Chicago Towel Co. v. Reynolds, 108
W. Va. 615, 152 S. E. 200 (1930).
33 Accord: Griffin v. Southern R. Co., 150 N. C. 312, 64 S. E. 16 (1909).
1196 S. E. 12 (W. Va. 1938).
2 196 S. B. 16 (W. Va. 1938).
3 General Accident, Fire, etc. Corp. v. Hymes, 77 Okla. 20, 185 Pac. 1085, 8
A. L. R. 318 (1919).
4 Utter v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 65 Mich. 545, 32 N. W. 812, 8 Am. St. Rep.
913 (1887).
5 Allen v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n, 163 Iowa 217, 143 N. W. 574, 48 L. R.
A. (N. s.) 600 (1913).
Wildblood v. Continental Casualty Co., 182 La. 202, 161 So. 584 (1935).
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in clause four there is a decided tendency to impose an interpretation different from that in the other three.
The question raised in the Harper case is that of the interpretation of clauses one, two, and three. The clear case falling within
the operation of these exceptions is that of A intending to injure
B and in fact injuring B. The Indiana court pointed out that "the
7
intent of Hoal at the time he inflicted the injury is alone material. "
This proposition is well supported by cases, 8 the leading case on the
point being Travellers' Insurance Company v. McConkey9 in which
the United States Supreme Court held that in case of murder of B
by A, A's act is intentional and comes within the scope of the exception. The doctrine was carried a step farther in the case of
Butero v. Travelers' Accident Insurance Company.10 There, B was
shot and killed while at work in a coal shed, it not being known by
whom the shot was fired or why, but the Wisconsin court held that
since the circumstances strongly indicated that the killing was intentional, it would be within the exception though there was no
particular individual to whom the intent could be attributed.
The other extreme, a case falling clearly outside the exception
as embodied in clauses one, two, or three, is that of A causing injury by acting without regard to human safety, as by firing a gun,
either not intending to injure anyone or not intending to injure
any particular person. In Travelers' Protective Association v. Fawcett," A entered a bank with the purpose of robbing it and while
there fired shots indiscriminately at the ceiling and at the people in
the bank. B, an employee, was killed. The Indiana court found
that though under the criminal law A would have been presumed
to have intended the natural and probable consequences of his acts,
this presumption would not prevail in a civil case, and since A did
not intend specifically to kill B, the killing was not intentional within the meaning of the policy. The same conclusion has been
reached in cases of mistaken identity 2 where A injures or kills B
7 Travelers' Protective Ass'n v. Fawcett, 56 Ind. App. 111, 104 N. E. 991

(1914).

8 Travelers' Protective Ass'n v. Langholz, 86 Fed. 60 (C. 0. A. 5th, 1898)
Jarnagin v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n, 133 Fed. 892 (0. C. A. 6th, 1904).
9 127 U. S. 661, 32 L. Ed. 108 (1888).
10 96 Wis. 536, 71 N. W. 811 (1897).
2156 Ind. App. 111, 104 N. E. 991 (1914). Seemingly in accord is Jefferson
Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Myers, 256 Ky. 174, 75 S. W. (2d) 1095 (1934), in
which B, a sheriff protecting miners going to their w9rk, was killed by strikers
whom the jury found intended to kill only the miners. Killing held unintentional.
12 Newsome v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 143 Ga. 785, 85 S. B. 1035 (1915); Mah
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believing B to be C. The West Virginia court by dictum in the
Adkins case, which is one of mistaken identity, says that if these
facts should arise under an exception worded as those under consideration here, the killing would be deemed unintentional.
The difficult problem with respect to the interpretation of
clauses one, two, and three arises in the cases falling between these
two extremes, cases where A injures B, not knowing the identity
of B at the time of the injury, not having in mind to injure any particular person known to him, but yet, intending to injure the individual before him, whoever that individual may be. Courts in
deciding this problem of interpretation admit that there is an ambiguity"3 in the use of the words "intentional" or "design" in each
of the first three clauses, the possible meanings being: (a) intent
on the part of A to perform an act; (b) intent to inflict an injury,
but not necessarily on B; (c) intent to injure a particular individual whose presence is perceived by A but whose identity is
unknown to him; and (d) intent to injure a particular person B
whose identity is known to A at the time of the injury. In attempting to clear up this ambiguity, courts generally employ a rule of
interpretation which states that "When a stipulation or exception
to a policy of insurance, emanating from the insurer, is capable of
two meanings, the one is to be adopted which is most favorable to
the insured."1 4 This leads to a finding in favor of the insured in
cases (a) and (b) as indicated by cases previously cited, but as also
heretofore pointed out, permits protection of the insurer in case
(d). In spite of this tendency to favor the insured, class (e) still
remains contestable territory. The leading American case involving
these facts is Utter v. Travelers' Insurance Company, 5 a case
labeled by the West Virginia court in the Harper ease as one of
mistaken identity, but presenting facts hardly seeming to warrant
its being classified as such. There, A, a deputy sheriff in search of
B, a deserter from the army, opened the door to the room in which
he believed he would find B and was immediately confronted by one
of several occupants of the room who pointed a gun at him. A, not
knowing the identity of the individual, fired, killing him. A later
learned that his victim was B. In holding that the case should be
See v. North American Accident Ins. Co., 190 Cal. 721, 213 Pac. 42, 26 A. L. 1.

123 (1923).

'a bid. Also dictum in Adkins v. Provident Life & Ins. Co., regarding the
policy in question in Harper v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co.
14 Allen v. St. Louis Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 473 (1881).
15 65 Mlich. 545, 32 N. W. 812, 8 Am. St. Rep. 913 (1887).
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submitted to the jury and that they would be warranted in finding
in favor of the insured, the Michigan court said, "If, when Berry
fired this shot, he did not know the man he fired at was Utter, and
did not intend to kill Utter, it can not be said that Utter lost his
life by the design of Berry." Another case presenting substantially this same situation is that of General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corporation v. Hymes,6 also considered in the Harper
case as one of mistaken identity. B, leaving a negro dance hall on
a dark night, spoke a phrase involving the name of A. A, hearing
this, immediately fired at the speaker and killed him, not knowing
at the moment of firing that his victim was his friend B. There
was no evidence shown of an intent on the part of A to injure any
third party C, but only that he intended to injure the one whose
voice he heard. Here also the court found that the killing was not
intentional within the meaning of the exception. Another situation, differing but slightly from the two above cited and seeming
likewise to fall within class (c), is that involved in Hutchcraft's
Executor v. Travelers' Insurance Company.17 B was waylaid and
robbed by A. In the course of the robbery, A shot and killed B.
Here, the Kentucky court does not emphasize the fact that A was
unaware of the identity of B, the fact which seems to be the determining one in the Utter and Hymes cases, and holds the killing an
intentional one within the meaning of the policy. The feeling of
the court seems to be that it is enough that the assailant be aware
that there is an individual in his presence and that he intend to
injure that individual regardless of his identity. This same view
seems to have been taken by the West Virginia court in the Harper
case when saying, "We can not say that knowledge on the part of
Scalf that it was Harper at whom he was shooting is necessary to
create the intent required under the policy provision." In the
Harper case, B, who was returning home on a dark night, heard A
approaching and and shone his flashlight in the direction of A who
fired, killing B, not knowing at that moment the identity of the
person flashing the light. P, as beneficiary, brought an action
against the insurance company on B's policy which provided for
double indemnity in case of accidental death, and stating further
that, "these provisions do not apply ...in case death results from
bodily injury inflicted by the insured himself or intentionally by
16 77 Okla. 20, 185 Pac. 1085, 8 A. L. R. 318 (1919).
17 87 Ky. 300, 8 S. W. 570 (1888).
Presenting a similar situation, DeGraw
v. National Accident Society, 4 N. Y. Supp. 912 (1889).
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another person." At the trial, B's death was found to have been
accidental and not intentional within the meaning of the exemption,
and thus double indemnity was allowed. On error to the supreme
court the finding was set aside on the ground that the death of B
was intentional, the court stating, "This being the undisputed
factual situation, we are driven to the conclusion that Scalf, having
no other particular person in mind whom he intended to kill, intentionally killed the man who flashed the light in his face." It
seems that the distinction noted by the West Virginia court between
the situation presented by the Harpercase and those of the Utter and
Hyrnes cases is slight, if in fact there be any at all. Apparently,
the West Virginia court in interpreting these exceptions as stated
in clauses one, two and three is adopting the meaning of the word
"intentional" as applied in class (c), intent to injure a particular
individual whose presence is perceived by A but whose identity is
unknown to him at the time.
The remaining question is that raised by the Adkivs case concerning the interpretation of the exception as worded in example
four, where the injury was inflicted "by the intentional act of a
third person." The possible interpretations seem to be first, to
treat this phrase as synonymous with those of the other three classes,
or second, to give strict construction to the clause thus bringing it
within class (a) of the possible meanings of the word "intentional"
as enumerated heretofore and greatly expanding the scope of the
exception in favor of the insurer. In Wildblood v. Continental
Casualty Company,"s A killed B, mistaking B for C, a deputy
sheriff. In an action on the insurance policy of B limiting the
liability of the insurer in case of "injury resulting from the intentional act of the insured or of any other person," the Louisiana
court, without discussing any distinction, treated this wording as
synonymous with that in the other three classes, and since this was
a case of mistaken identity, held the killing not intentional. Supporting the distinction ignored in the Wildbload case is National
Life INsurance Company v. Cougklin,1 9 in which, A, a lady at home
is182 La. 202, 161 So. 584 (1935), affirming Brooks v. Continental Casualty
Co., 13 La. App. 502, 128 So. 183 (1930). In Railway Officials & Employees
App. 565 (1895), the policy read "death
Accident Ass'n v. McCabe, 61 Ill.
resulting from the intentional act of any person". In deciding the case the
court treats the clause as though it were synonymous with "intentional injuries
inficted", and cites McConkey v. Travellers' Ins. Co. A recognition of the
distinction between these phrases, however, would not have changed the decision
of this case.
19 72 Colo. 440, 212 Pac. 486 (1923). In Continental Casualty Co. v. Cunningham, 188 Ala. 159, 66 So. 41 (1914), A, who was escaping from a group of
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at night alone, was frightened by a noise at the rear of the house
and fired from the back door into the dark, killing B of whose
identity she was unaware. The Colorado court inferred in its
opinion that it might have adopted the view enunciated in the Utter
case had the provisions of the policy in question permitted it, but
instead, emphasis was placed on the wording of the exception reading "by the intentional act of any person," and the killing was
held intentional. In line with this and not with the view in the
Widblood case is the holding of the West Virginia court in Adkins
v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Company." There, A
killed B, mistaking B for C. In action on a policy limiting the
liability of defendant company when the death was caused by an
injury inflicted by the "intentional act" of another, the supreme
court reversed the trial court on the basis of the distinction noted
above, the court stating, "Though the injury was not inflicted on
the person whom Ratti intended to strike, it is nevertheless obvious
that his striking the blow or blows was an intentional act on his
part." The court sustained the distinction made between the wording of the exception here and that of the exception in the Harper
case purely on contract principles, that the phrase "by the intentional act" is not ambiguous and admits of only one interpretation.
An argument worthy of note, however, exists in support of the contrary view assumed by the Louisiana court in that the extreme
similarity existing between the wording of each of the four forms
of the exception leaves little doubt but that the insurance companies in using these different phrases intended them to bear identical meanings. This argument is particularly forceful in light
of the present tendency on the part of courts to break away from
the policy of applying contract principles in the determination of
problems in insurance law, and to substitute in its stead a doctrine
of a fair relation between the parties.2
officers, killed B, another officer attempting to capture him. The court distinguished this from the Utter case on the ground of the difference in the term
of the exception in the two cases, the clause here limiting the insurer's liability
"where the injury causing the loss results ....
from the intentional act of the
insured or any other person."
20 196 S. E. 16 (W. Va. 1938).
21 "Taking
no account of legislative limitations upon freedom of contract,
in the purely judicial development of our law we have taken the law of insurance practically out of the category of contract, and we have established that
the duties of public service companies are not contractual, as the nineteenthcentury sought to make them, but are instead relational; they do not flnw from
agreements which the public servant may make as he chooses, they flow from
the calling in which he has engaged and his consequent relation to the public."
POUND, SPmlT OF THE CommoN LAw (1921) 29.
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If the clause excepts "intentional injuries" or "injuries intentionally inflicted", the insured will be protected if the injury
was accidentally or mistakenly inflicted upon him, but if the exception relates to injuries from "intentional acts", he will be excluded from recovery if the third party has performed an intentional act.
A. F. G.
THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST SUICIDE IN
INSURANCE CASES
The exact date of the origin, or the place or decision in which
the presumption against suicide was first applied to a specific case
seems to be unknown. In the early days of the common-law system suicide was not only a felony but was considered a more heinous
crime than murder in those times when the rigors of the laws
punishing crimes were in no sense comparable to the standards
of the present.' As described by Blackstone, the suicide was given
an ignominious burial by the highway, with a stake driven through
his body; moreover, all his goods and chattels were forfeited to the
Crown.2 This severity of penalities meted out by the English law
to restrain the practice of self-destruction fell heavily upon the
family of the suicide, and it is easy to see how the lawyers of the
day would seek to devise some method to ease this burden cast upon
the guiltless. Thus, seemingly, arose the oft-utilized presumption
against suicide in case of an otherwise unexplained violent death.
This presumption has suffered strange and illogical abuses; so it
is not to be wondered at that some courts have taken the attitude
that it has outlived its usefulness.3 That this presumption against
suicide has become rather firmly embedded in our law is not to be
doubted. 4 In the language of the courts it is based upon two
principles: First, that man's natural instinct is to avoid injury
and to preserve life, and it would be highly improbable that he
1Hartman, The Presumption Against Suicide as Applied in Insuranee Cases
(1935) 19 MARQ. L. BEv. 20.
24 BL. COMM.
3 Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 Atl. 644 (1934).
4 Grand Lodge v. Bannister, 80 Ark. 190, 96 S. W. 472 (1906); Van Norman
v. Modern Brotherhood, 143 Iowa 536, 121 N. W. 1080 (1900); Green v. N. Y.
Life Ins. Co., 192 Iowa 32, 182 N. W. 808 (1921) ; Vicars v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 158 Ky. 1, 164 S. W. 106 (1914) ; Massachusetts Protective Ass'n v. Cranford, 137 Miss. 876, 102 So. 171 (1924) ; Wharton v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 178 N.
C. 135, 100 S. E. 266 (1919); Lamb v. Union By., 195 N. Y. 260, 88 N. E. 371
(1909).
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